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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The I Haii t curt of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated sections 78-2a-3(2)G) and 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This apjvii! pieseiiis tin I allowing issues for review. 
Issue #1: Whether .the trial court should liau* }]M»ftal W mi le \ \ Motion for . 
Summary Judgment based on the undisputed facts which demonstrated, as a matter of 
law, ilull (intton's conduct was outside the course and scope of his independent 
contractor relationship * A uiu\\ ^ui -inui, therefore, be vicariously 
liable for Bearden's losses resulting from that conduct. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a denial of summary judgment, the reviewing 
court is to "Yonsulei m\\\ w lidlin lite trial court correctly applied the law and correctly 
concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed v Su t. /1 ! hiderwriters v. E & 
C Trucking, 2000 UT 71, f 14, 10 P.3d 338 (quoting Aurora Credit Servs. v. Liberty W. 
Dev. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998)). No deference is accorded the trial court's 
conclusions of law. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 I»I m 1 I.!, Wo I' 2d 104^ When 
reviewing an order denying a motion for summary judgment, appellate c * mrt \ jr 111 
review "the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the . . . the nonmoving party." Surely ! Underwriters, 2000 I J I 71 , f 15, 10 P.3d 338. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 213. 
Issue #2: Whether the trial court should have granted Wardley's Motion for 
Directed Verdict based on the testimony which demonstrated, as a matter of law, that 
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Gritton's conduct was outside the course and scope of his independent contractor 
relationship with Wardley and Wardley could not, therefore, be vicariously liable for 
Bearden's losses resulting from that conduct. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, there 
is one standard of review: An appellate court will "'reverse only if, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict.'" Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 
77, f 33, 31 P.3d 557 (quoting Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992)); 
see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, f 16, 990 P.2d 933 ("When reviewing any 
challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review "'the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds 
could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict.'" (quoting White v. Fox, 
665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983))); Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, 52 
(Utah 1994); DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) ("A directed 
verdict and a judgment n.o.v. are justified only if, after looking at the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 'the trial court 
concludes that there is no competent evidence which would support a verdict in his 
favor.'" (quoting Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982))). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 708 at 171-75. 
Issue #3: Whether the jury was properly instructed regarding the relationship 
between Gritton and Wardley; the standard governing Wardley's vicarious liability for 
247434 2 0 
Gritton's acts; and the appropriate evidentiary standard governing Bearden's claims for 
fraud. 
Standard of Review: An appeal challenging the jury instructions presents a 
question of law with respect to which the trial court is given m > ti< Terence. Ong v. If2 
Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
238 (I lUih \W21 Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989)). Similarly, "Whether 
[a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question 
of law" which is reviewed for correctness. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 
2001 11 ( 7 1 38, 31 P.3d 557. Nonetheless, appellate courts will affirm the use of the 
jury instructions when they "taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury even 
where one or more of the instructions, standing along, are not as full oi accurate as they 
might have been." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R 708 at 229. The trial court did not 
permit counsel an opportunity to completely state his objections lo die |iiry instructions 
on the record, contrary to Rule 51(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("Objections to 
written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury . . . . The 
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections ouiside lin1 hearing of the jury."). 
The trial court's refusal to permit Wardley's counsel to fully set forth the bases for his 
objections should not preclude consideration of this issue. See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley 
Hospital, 830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) ("The judge did not afford counsel any 
opportunity to enter objections on the record before the jury retire* * vhis court should 
not enjoin [the] appeal because of this irregularity by the trial court."). 
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Issue # 4: Whether the Special Verdict was confusing and improperly tied the 
jury's findings of Gritton's fault to Wardley and whether the Special Verdict allowed the 
jury to find there was fraud by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has correctly refused to give a special 
verdict form is a question of law. Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, f 22, 984 P.2d 960 
(citing State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 655 (Utah 1995)). Nonetheless, "a court has 
considerable discretion in accepting proposed special verdict forms." Id. (citing Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989)). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 708 at 229. 
Issue #5: Whether the trial court erred in failing to follow Rule 47(n) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure when the jury had a question regarding the meaning of the 
Special Verdict. 
Standard of Review: The determination of the propriety of a trial court's 
communication with a jury during deliberations is reviewed under a correction-of-error 
standard. The trial court will be reversed only if the error is "'substantial or 
prejudicial. . . such that the result would have been different had it not taken place.'" 
Board of Commissioners of the State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Utah 
1997)(quoting Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979)). 
This issue was not preserved for appeal but should be considered preserved 
because trial counsel was unaware that the jury had submitted a question to the judge 
until being informed of that fact by Wardley's current counsel, who did not discover the 
issue until the record on appeal was received from the trial court. It was impossible for 
247434_2 4 
trial counsel to preserve the issue for appeal when he had no knowledge of the issue's 
existence. 
Issue #6: Whether the evidence supports the judgment for compensatory and 
punitive damages awarded against Wardley, in the amount of approximately 
$135,000.00. 
Standard of Review: Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in their 
assessment of damages. See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995) (citing 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985)). A 
reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's findings and 
will uphold its calculation of damages so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it. 
Id. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 653. 
Issue #7: Whether the trial court appropriately awarded attorney fees of 
$46,970.19. 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 
(Utah 1998) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
Similarly, "whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are 
sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." Id. (citing State v. Pharris, 846 
P.2d 454, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Once it has been determined that a party is legally 
entitled to a fee award, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes 
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a reasonable attorney fee. Id. (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988)). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 558. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-1, et seq. 
See Addendum. 
Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Jurors. 
Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for 
deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part 
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of 
law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct 
them into court. Upon their being brought into court the 
information required must be given in the presence of, or after 
notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given 
in writing or stated on the record. 
Rule 51(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Instructions to Jury; Objections 
(d) Objections to instructions. Objections to written instructions 
shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury. 
Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given 
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The 
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the 
hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the 
failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned 
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In objecting to the 
giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which 
the objection is made and the grounds for the objection. 
247434_2 6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arose out of the sale of rental property owned by Lucille Bearden 
("Bearden"1) to Gritton, whom Bearden had hired as a real estate agent initially to help 
her sell the rental property. Bearden and Gritton agreed he would buy the property on a 
contract. Gritton, however, surreptitiously had Bearden sign a Warranty Deed; had the 
Warranty Deed improperly notarized and recorded, thereby transferring the title to 
himself. In addition to defaulting on the purchase contract, Gritton took out several loans 
secured by the property, failing to pay two of them. Bearden, Mr. Bearden and the 
Family Trust sued Gritton, his employer, Wardley Corporation, the notary, the title 
company for whom the notary worked and the surety on the notary's bond. 
Course of Proceedings 
The initial Complaint in this case was filed on November 30, 1998 against 
Defendants Wardley Corporation and Guy Gritton. (R. 1.) On May 20,1999, an Order 
was entered granting Plaintiffs permission to file their Amended Complaint to add as 
Defendants Charlene Burns-Nielson, Backman Stewart Title Services Ltd., and Old 
Republic Surety Group. (R. 102.) On January 11, 2000, Wardley filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 213.) No hearing was held, and by minute entry dated April 6, 
2000, the trial court denied Wardley's motion, "for the reasons specified in the opposing 
memorandum." (R. 305.) An Order to this effect was entered on July 12, 2000. 
Unless a distinction is necessary, all of the plaintiffs are referred to collectively as 
"Bearden." 
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(R. 307.) On August 2, 2000, Wardley filed a petition for interlocutory review of the 
denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 311), which was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court by its Order dated September 20, 2000. (R. 331.) 
By Order dated May 18, 2001, Burns-Neilson, Backman Stewart, and Old 
Republic were dismissed from the suit after settling with Plaintiffs. (R. 353.) 
A two-day trial was held on September 4-5, 2001. At the close of plaintiffs' case 
in chief, Wardley brought a Motion for Directed Verdict. (R. 708 at 171-74.) That 
motion was denied. {Id. at 174.) After deliberations, the jury brought back a verdict 
against Wardley and Gritton, (R. 471, 475), and on November 13, 2001, the trial court 
entered a judgment against Wardley and Gritton in the amount of $75,000, punitive 
damages against Gritton in the amount of $25,000, and against Wardley in the amount of 
$15,000. (R. 644.) Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and 
Prejudgment Interest after the verdict was returned (R. 479-81). Pursuant to this Motion, 
the trial court further awarded $1,107.00 in costs, $46,970.19 in attorneys' fees, and 
$7,203.00 in prejudgment interest. (R. 644) 
Statement of Facts 
At all times relevant to this case, Gritton was a real estate agent affiliated with 
Wardley through a written independent contractor agreement. (Tr. Ex. 2, 3) In 
approximately June of 1997, Bearden engaged Gritton and Wardley to help her sell a 
home located at 550 Adams Avenue, Midvale, Utah, which she had been renting out (the 
"Property"). (R. 707 at 12.) The parties entered into a Listing Contract and Agency 
Disclosure so Gritton could help Lucille sell the Property. {Id. at 15-16; Tr. Ex. 4.) 
247434_2 8 
Shortly after the Property was placed on the market, Gritton told Lucille that his wife had 
asked him to move out and advised Lucille he personally might be interested in 
purchasing the Property for $89,000.00. (R. 707 at 19-21, 114-15. Gritton told Bearden 
he planned to make improvements to the Property and resell it at a higher price. (Id. 
at 19, 114-15.) Bearden agreed to sell Gritton the Property. (Id.) 
On July 11, 1997, Gritton came to Bearden's home to have her sign papers relating 
to the sale of the Property to him. (Id. at 24, 26-27.) Bearden and Gritton executed a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC"), which stated Gritton would purchase the 
Property for $89,000. (Id.\ Tr. Ex. 7.) Under the REPC, Bearden agreed to accept 
$400.00 per month from Gritton as "interest only" payments while Gritton was living in 
the Property and fixing it up. (R. 707 at 20, 114-15.) Gritton was to make a balloon 
payment of $89,000 at the end of five years. (Id. at 20; 115.) The REPC required Gritton 
to provide a $500 earnest money deposit on or before October 15, 1997. Addendum 
No. 1 to the REPC indicates Gritton was purchasing the Property to fix it up and sell it at 
a profit. (Tr. Ex. 7.) 
At the meeting on July 11, 1997, Gritton handed Bearden papers to be signed or 
initialed as Gritton instructed. (R. 707 at 26.) Bearden relied on Gritton's 
representations as to the contents of the documents relating to Gritton's purchase of the 
Property, and then signed them without reading them. (Id.) In addition to the REPC and 
among the documents Bearden apparently signed during that meeting (or at a meeting 
five days later) was a Warranty Deed purporting to transfer title to the Property from 
Bearden to Gritton. (Tr. Ex. 9.) Gritton did not disclose that he was having Bearden sign 
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a Warranty Deed and Bearden did not realize that she was signing a Warranty Deed to the 
Property. (R. 707 at 27.) 
The Warranty Deed was later notarized by Charlene Burns-Nielson, who did not 
witness Bearden's signature. (R. 708 at 179.) The Warranty Deed with its improper 
notarization was recorded by Gritton several months later. (R. 707 at 137, 143.) Gritton 
did not tell Bearden he had recorded the Warranty Deed (id. at 149) and, in fact, their 
agreement did not call for title to transfer until after Gritton had fully paid for the 
Property. (Id. at 27-28.) 
Gritton moved into the Property and sporadically made the monthly payments 
required by the REPC. (R. 707 at 32-33.) In total, Gritton paid Bearden $3,200, and did 
not make any payments after May of 1998, although he remained in the house until 
November 3, 1998. (Id.) Eventually, Bearden contacted an attorney to look into getting 
copies of the papers she had signed with Gritton and getting Gritton to make the 
promised payments. (Id. at 34.) Bearden's attorney discovered that title to the Property 
had been transferred to Gritton and that large liens had been placed against the Property. 
(Id. at 35.) The loans Gritton had taken went into foreclosure. (Id. at 37.) Bearden was 
able to pay Gritton's loans off and save the home from being sold at public sale by 
borrowing nearly $60,000 and arranging for the Deed of Trust held by Gritton's lender to 
be transferred and assigned to her. (Id.) 
10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), is no 
longer good law, the trial court erred by not assessing Wardley's right to control the real 
estate agent, Gritton, to determine whether he was an "employee" or an independent 
contractor of Wardley. 
With respect to Bearden's claims that Wardley should be vicariously liable, 
reasonable minds could not disagree that the actions of Gritton were not within 1) the 
scope of his employment, 2) his apparent authority, or 3) the scope of his subagency with 
his broker, Wardley. Although Gritton had been given limited authority to undertake 
certain actions with respect to helping buyers and sellers of real property, such as 
Bearden, with marketing their properties, Gritton did not, under any agency theory, have 
authority to fraudulently obtain Bearden's signature on a Warranty Deed, and have it 
notarized and recorded, so that he could then obtain several loans by securing them with 
Bearden's property - all for his personal benefit. Gritton's lack of authority to do the 
very acts of which Bearden complains, should have prevented this case from going to the 
jury on the issue of Wardley's vicarious liability. 
Under the traditional three-part test established in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 
P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989), Gritton's actions were not within the scope of his 
employment, or the scope of his subagency, with Wardley. Although Gritton's used his 
legitimate real estate activities "as a springboard," Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 
1391 (Utah 1995), for his fraudulent actions, the actions he took to defraud Bearden were 
not the general kind of activities a real estate agent performs. In addition, they were not 
11 
intended to further Wardley's interest but, rather, as Gritton testified, to serve solely his 
own private and personal interests. 
There was no basis for finding Gritton had apparent authority to defraud Bearden 
because Wardley took no steps which might reasonably be found to cause third parties to 
believe that Gritton was clothed with apparent authority to purchase property for his own 
account. Gritton was only authorized to act as Wardley's agent in a limited capacity. 
Bearden's sole and exclusive reliance on Gritton for a claim that Gritton had apparent 
authority is wrong. 
Wardley's inquiries about this listing elicited lies and deceit from Gritton. Being 
thus kept in the dark, there was no reason for Wardley to have taken any of the aggressive 
actions suggested by Bearden in an effort to protect Bearden. The fraud and the harm 
were unanticipated. In fact, Bearden had an obligation to ascertain the scope of the 
authority she supposed Gritton had. There is no basis to impute Gritton's knowledge to 
Wardley. 
One of the problems with this case is that the instructions to the jury unnecessarily 
confused Gritton's actions with the actions and statements of Wardley in a way that was 
prejudicial to Wardley. The trial court essentially told the jury that Gritton's acts could 
bind Wardley because Wardley, as a corporation, could only act through its agents. 
For the same reasons articulated in connection with Wardley's scope of 
employment argument, above, Gritton's conduct was not within the scope of his 
subagency relationship with Wardley. Wardley can only be held responsible for those 
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things its agent does which are within the scope of the agent's employment or in the 
course of carrying out the duties assigned to the agent. 
Wardley cannot be held directly liable for the results of Gritton's fraud based on a 
claimed breach of fiduciary its duty. Wardley could not have anticipated Gritton's 
fraudulent scheme largely due to Gritton's lies and deceit practiced on Wardley. No 
evidence was submitted as to an applicable standard of care, leaving the jury to 
apparently make one up. 
Likewise, Wardley cannot be held directly liable for punitive damages. There is 
no doubt that Wardley did not act in a sufficiently culpable manner to warrant being held 
responsible for punitive damages based on its own conduct. Rather, it appears that the 
jury attributed Gritton's conduct to Wardley. This appears to have been the result of the 
lower court's confusing jury instructions. There was no evidence of any act by any 
person must sufficiently high-up in the Wardley organization to justify holding the 
corporation responsible. The only evidence regarding willful, malicious, or reckless 
conduct was that of Gritton. 
The Special Verdict form used by the court prejudiced Wardley because it 
instructed the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard for determining fraud. In 
addition, when the jury had a follow up question, the trial judge failed to call the 
attorneys back to the court as required by Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Finally, the jury's calculation of damages is not supported by competent evidence. 
The basis of the jury's damage award is a mystery, even to Bearden's counsel, with the 
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final figure appearing to have been pulled out of thin air. In addition, according to 
Bearden's supposition as to how they arrived at a number, the jury held Wardley 
vicariously liable for Gritton's rent, failed to credit $3,200 Gritton paid the Bearden and 
clearly did not account for account for damages caused by the settling defendants, 
Backman Stuart Title Company, Charlene Burns-Nielson, and the Old Republic Surety 
Group. 
ARGUMENT 
Wardley believes this case presents a factual setting where none of the various 
theories promoted by Bearden were sufficient to hold Wardley vicariously liable for 
Gritton fraudulently obtaining Bearden's signature on a Warranty Deed, having it 
illegally notarized, recording it and fraudulently obtaining several loans secured by the 
Property effectively stolen from Bearden - all for his personal benefit. 
This court's recent decision in Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 
2001 UT App 48, 21 P.3d 235, is instructive in disposing of Bearden's suppositions. In 
Cannon, Wardley's agent, Aries Hansen ("Hansen"), signed four listing agreements with 
the Mascaros. Id. at f 2. The first listing agreement was set to expire the next day, 
November 15, 1993. Id. The expiration dates on the other three listing agreements were 
left blank. Id. Hansen, after obtaining the Mascaros' signatures, and without their 
knowledge or approval, fraudulently altered the expiration date on the first of the four 
listing agreements (changing the expiration date from November 15, 1993 to November 
15, 1994), and unilaterally filled in the blank expiration dates on the three other listing 
247434_2 14 
agreements with the same fraudulent date. Id. Unaware, the Mascaros listed the property 
in September 1994 with Cannon's real estate brokerage company and, when it was sold 
shortly thereafter, Cannon was paid the commission. Id. Wardley, ignorant of Hansen's 
fraud, sued for the commission under what it thought were extant listing agreements. Id. 
atI3. 
At trial, the court concluded that Wardley's listing agreements were voidable and 
unenforceable due to Hansen's fraud. Id. Cannon and the Mascaros then requested 
attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. This request was denied. Id. at 
14. Cannon appealed, arguing that pursuant to principles of vicarious liability, Hansen's 
fraudulent actions should be imputed to Wardley, thus making Wardley's suit "without 
merit" and "not brought or asserted in good faith," and entitling Cannon to attorney fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Id. 
In Cannon, the Court of Appeals rejected Cannon's vicarious liability theory. Id. 
at \ 11. The court refused to extend the holding of Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 
151 (Utah 1991), and thereby expand the scope of vicarious liability. 
In distinguishing Hodges, the Cannon court noted that the knowledge of the 
agent/employee "could be imputed to his employer only if [the agent/employee] acted 
within the scope of his authority and was motivated at least in part to carry out the 
employer's purposes." 2001 UT App 48, f 9, 21 P.3d 235 (footnote omitted). In a 
footnote addressing the scope of the real estate agent's authority, the court noted: 
Hansen may have had authority to enter into the listing 
agreements with the Mascaros; however, he did not, under any 
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agency theory, have authority to fraudulently change the dates on 
those agreements. 
Id. at f 9 n. 5 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, here, although Gritton had authority to enter into the Listing Contract 
and Agency Disclosure with Bearden (Tr. Ex. 4), he did not, "under any agency theory, 
have authority to fraudulently" obtain Bearden's signature on the Warranty Deed, and 
have it notarized and recorded, so that he could then obtain several loans by securing 
them with Bearden's property - all for his personal benefit. Gritton's clear lack of 
authority to do that of which Bearden complains, should have prevented this case from 
going to the jury on the issue of Wardley being vicariously liable for Gritton's fraudulent 
activities - whether in the context of Bearden's subagency, apparent authority or 
respondeat superior theories, or being directly liable for breaching its fiduciary duty. 
MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Because Wardley challenges a trial court's ruling concerning a motion for a 
directed verdict and questions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's 
conclusions as to Wardley's vicarious liability, it is required to '"marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, 111, 
448 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, 
f 33, 31 P.3d 557 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. 24(a)(9). 
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Gritton's Relationship With Wardley. 
1. Gritton, as a real estate agent with Wardley pursuant r^  - Tuly 1 - ' °°7 
Broker-Siiles F:\milivv (Vnh"'»i'(',ni,,l|*(,ndriil l'"onlm lui A;.,iiinin.,ni fir \l\ ,! i w.is 
authorized to perform certain iJt, work on behalf of Wardley. (Id.) Such w ork 
included the solicitation of real estate related service contracts to be taken in the name of 
Wartlic - Id) 
2. Real estate agents and brokers represent or act on behalf of individuals 
buying or selling real property And llic job of an agent or broker Is to help them buy or 
sell |uoperl> \\< O N Jill l<>N | 
3. Wardlrv provided (Jiillon winIIIIi 
a .111 office; 
c. a name tag with Wardlej "s ^ 
d. access to secretaries, a reception] si, and . iiici -Mjuve and support 
staff; 
e. I rim phone service; 
f. aa.oiJiilifig sen ices; 
g. signs, which Wnrdley required to have the Wardley name; 
1
 i inagaziik1 I'll Iiidi agents could advertise properties; 
i a television program on which agents could advertise properties; 
j ads In newspaper* . . •. .uch agents c^uo ^Kertise open 1 louses; 
k. other agents wit1, "'horn to network; 
1. access to the local r\c Listing Service ("MI ,S"; 
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m. forms, such as the Listing Agreement (Tr. Ex. 4), the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23) and the Under Contract Information Sheet (Tr. Ex. 10), which 
bore the Wardley logo; and 
n. opportunities for training. 
(R. 707 at 103-06; R. 708 at 199-200, 201-03, 211.) 
The Listing Agreement With Bearden. 
4. In June of 1997, Gritton solicited business from Bearden, whom he had 
known growing up (R. 707 at 8) and from church. {Id. at 8-9.) Bearden agreed to use 
Gritton as her agent at least in part because he worked for Wardley, which Bearden 
recognized as a reputable real estate broker. {Id. at 13, 17.) 
5. The two parties discussed Gritton acting as Bearden's real estate agent and 
Gritton convinced Bearden she should sell a home she owned at 550 Adams Avenue, 
Midvale, Utah ("the Property"). (R. 707 at 13.) 
6. Bearden knew other properties in her area were selling for $125,000 
(R. 707 at 17), but Gritton convinced her to sell the Property for $89,000. {Id. at 16, 17.) 
The Property was listed for $89,000.00. (Tr. Ex. 4; R. 707 at 19-20, 111.) 
7. Gritton signed a Listing Agreement on behalf of Wardley, (Tr. Ex. 4; 
R. 707 at 16, 109; R. 708 at 218), on a form provided by Wardley. (R. 707 at 117.) As 
Wardley's client, Bearden was owed a fiduciary duty by Wardley. (R. 707 at 110-11; 
R. 708 at 219.) 
8. Bearden did not read the Listing Agreement before she signed it. (R. 707 
at 46) Bearden did not really understand the limited agency provisions in Section 6. 
(R. 707 at 46, 47, 50-51,69.) 
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9. She could not recall if Gritton ever explained the limited agencj provisions 
to her (R. 707 at 69) and neither could Gritton, (R. 707 ,il 159-160; 166-67.) 
M a r k e t i n g Bearden's Property, 
10. Shortly after the Property wa^ placed on the market, Gritton received an 
offer for $89,000.00 from, a young couple m buy Bearden's Property, but they reneged a 
< implr ml d*i\ s bin 111 II ill I \ >') ' • I . • . . • 
11. Shortly after that deal fell through, Onuui * • " l 1 
purchase the Property on the same conditions as the young couple - for $89,000.00. 
( 
12 r ,ien agreed to ac u* <nh i n *m Untton with a balloon 
pd\iininl in li ^ .. v\as ie>, < u..*.. .^\L ,aJ heeh gelling from 
renters (id.), uiiu. I C ^ uian &hc nau i licated si 
disclosure form Gritton helped her fill < usi Id. at 23; Tr. Ex. _.,
 vo~ dial lorm, Gr^oii 
and Beai den had agreed that if Seller financing was selected by a buyer, the purchase 
price would be $95,0011 <M|h "'in .IHM (ii1 >nn M*<.| >«u) I|I I»• Li»u "< '»,"" " i" 
years. (Tr, Ex, 5.)) 
13. The $41)0,01) rniiiithly payment did not equal the 10% interest payment 
il 1 mi I mi i Unl nn ihf Ml '*i itiisii hMiir Inrin 11-1 II ,il I I i Id I 
14. Gritton and Bearden agreed that she would retain title in her name until the 
balloon payment was made. (R. 707 at 21.) 
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15. Gritton came to Bearden's home on July 11, 1997 to have her sign papers 
related to the sale of her Property to him. (R. 707 at 24.) As they talked about family 
and old friends, Gritton handed Bearden papers to be signed or initialed, as Gritton 
instructed. (Id. at 26.) 
16. Bearden did not read any of the documents. (Id.) Gritton was explaining 
them to her, and told her he would take care of her. (Id.) Bearden relied on Gritton's 
representations as to the contents of these documents and then signed them without 
reading them. (Id.) 
17. She signed the documents because she trusted him. (Id. at 9, 26, 63, 64, 
66.) She trusted Gritton because she knew him and his family (id. at 9, 64), they 
belonged to the same church, (id. at 9), and because he worked for a reputable broker, 
Wardley. (Id. at 63, 70-71.) 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract Between Gritton and Bearden, 
18. During this meeting, Bearden signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("the 
REPC") (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 26-27), on a form provided by Wardley. (R. 707 
at 117.) 
19. The REPC stated Gritton would purchase the Property for $89,000. (Tr. 
Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 117-18.) The REPC required Gritton to provide a $500 earnest 
money deposit on or before October 15,1997. (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 118.) 
20. The REPC clearly identified Gritton as the buyer. (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23.) 
21. Although the REPC discloses that both Gritton and Wardley were 
representing both sides of the transaction (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23 at f 5), Bearden did not really 
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understand the limited agency provisions. (R. 707 at 46, 47, 50-51, oy.; S:v - • 
understand that Gritton's or Wardley's duties were to her were going u> change. J\ 1\r 
a ) 
22. GriUoii |>iu\ iUcd a copy of the REPC to Wardley ' ~ '>\im\ capacity as 
Wardlev s jf>i'iil il« in , I I  I I ' ( i ' I I " » i 
23. A file was created, accord m:: f > Wardle\ - noli* t 
v 'as Wardley's policy to review the document in these iransac lion file as part of its 
24.11ms Wardlev 
~ irden and that he was acting as both Wardley's real estate agent representing the 
seller, and as the- buyer of :IK Property. (R 707 at 121, 123; R. 708 at 195.) 
1ll,,i W-inlln lull ipiilii '. aiuiM'sl d'.'cnts iliiiuii" ptopnties the\ had listed. 
(R. 708 at 215-16.) Gritton was not aware of this polic\ i i«'" 'I I " i l l I" ^ ) 
26. This policy was considered to be in the best interests of Wardley's clients 
11 "'ITS, ill ,1" I ' t . 1111.1 .ilioulJ lia\c Lduscd \\ a id ley some concern (Mat 223.) 
27. No one at Wardley evei u j ! -
asked him to stop representing Bearden v u"
 a; ;4 152, io8; R. 708 at 224., *n 
; n.iis loii/ihiiuhinl
 tii 1:>2-O3.) 
28. No OIK1 a( W; \i, . •. .. _ . ,.MIUIIC agent 
or asked another agent to step in and represent Bearden. (R. 708 at 224.) i 
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agreed to buy the Property, Gritton felt like he was in a buyer-seller situation, not an 
agency situation. (R. 707 at 167.) 
29. Wardley established a trust account for this transaction. (R. 708 at 215, 
222; Tr. Ex. 12.) 
30. Gritton did not make the $500 earnest money deposit required by the 
REPC. (R. 707 at 118.) 
31. It was Wardley's policy that earnest money should be turned in and 
deposited in the trust account within 24 hours. (R. 708 at 223.) 
32. Wardley was aware that Gritton failed to make the earnest money payment 
to Bearden, as required by the REPC. (Tr. Ex. 12; R. 708 at 222.) 
33. After the REPC was signed, Gritton prepared a Wardley approved form: 
"Under Contract Information Sheet." (Tr. Ex. 10; R. 707 at 121-23, 125.) Gritton 
provided a copy of the Under Contract form to Wardley in Gritton's capacity as 
Wardley's agent. (R. 707 at 125.) 
34. It was Wardley's policy to place the under contract information sheet in the 
tracking file. (R. 707 at 122-23, 125; R. 708 at 213-15, 221-22.) 
35. And again, Wardley's policy to review the documents once placed in the 
tracking file. (R. 708 at 213-15, 221-22.) 
36. Wardley sent Gritton an undated Reminder Notice requesting the earnest 
money and other documentation, and congratulating him on his sale. (Tr. Ex. 11.) 
Someone on behalf of Wardley wrote: "Way to go!" at the bottom of that sheet. (R. 707 
at 152-53; Tr. Ex. 11.) 
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37.Gritton wras notified by Wardley that the RLPC •• * J rxpinnl 'hi1'" in • 'MMftV 
money deposit had been received, and was asked to provide an appropriately modified 
and signal Rl'.h i I K I " -
Gritton's Fraudulent Obtaining a Warranty Deed, 
38. Among ihe documents Bearden signed during the July 1 : * > r r \u\ ting 
v ;i iWnrjinh I . .. :,. .w[vi;. uvm bcunien to Uritton 
(Tr.Ex.9.) 
39 Bearden does not recall signing any Warranty Deed. (R. 707 at 27.) She is 
i, I • ^ .u . iLxaiieasi^nine i; iKcause she has dealt with such documents 
before. (Id,) 
* ™ ;re is no dispute that Gritton fraudulently had Bearden *.M«» the Warranty 
Deed fR „!J ,^ J<>4.) 
•I I "I i i"il I (mi in/lion,"-. .11 in, I rcprrsenl.ilions \MIII respects :» his purchase ol the 
Property from Bearden were intentional and fraudulent. (R. 2J:< ''M 
42. (JI if ton did not disclose to Bearden that he had fii^d a Chapter 13 
: -; • * • • • ' - .:-..' ^ agreed to pui-Jia.^ v. iv,. Pioperty 
(R. 707 at 139), that a federal tax lien had 
\ alley at the time (id. at 140-41"; or thai his former brokerage company was suing him 
against on ,.*.> .... < ,*</ at 141.) 
43. Gritton tried to obtain financing foi Jus 
another lender, but was unable to because of his financial situation. (Id, at 142.) 
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44. During the meeting on July 11, 1997, at which Bearden signed the 
documents, Bearden asked to have her attorney review the papers. Gritton told her that 
would not be necessary as Wardley had an attorney who would look everything over and 
make sure everything was all right. (Id. at 27-28.) 
45. Bearden also noticed that one of the documents required her signature to be 
notarized. (Id. at 28-29.) Because the top of the document was covered up, she did not 
see what it was. (Id. at 29.) When Bearden offered to go to a notary just down the street, 
Gritton assured Bearden that a notary at Wardley's offices would handle the notarization. 
(Id. at 29-30.) 
46. The Warranty Deed was later notarized by a notary who did not witness 
Bearden's signature. (R. 708 at 179.) 
47. Gritton did not leave copies of the papers, but told Bearden that he would 
send them to her when everything was in order. (R. 707 at 31.) Although Bearden made 
several calls to Gritton to get copies, Gritton made up excuses and she was never 
provided copies of the papers she had signed. (Id. at 31.) 
48. During the meeting on July 11, 1997, Gritton mentioned that both he and 
Wardley were to receive a commission as a result of the Bearden transaction. (R. 707 
at 30.) Bearden understood that the commissions were to be paid out of the purchase 
price. (Id. at 30.) 
49. An Addendum No. 1 to the REPC was presented by Gritton to Bearden. 
(Tr. Ex. 8.) Although her signature to the Addendum was dated July 16, 1998, she 
remembers signing all of the papers on the same day. (R. 707 at 58-59.) 
247434_2 9 4 
50. Addendum No. 1 reflects a reduction i ! ^ *), 
which was to reflect the 6% commission. ($89,000 ^ ; commission = $83,000;
 Kli. 
] M , ' |.| 1(1 ' ,1 1 i l l Il II li| i. 1 
51. Gritton provided n . , ' p "" "• Vdlntili, N W,""", hl *<»7 
at 123.) \gain. this was done in his capacity as Wardley's agent. {Id. at 125.) 
Gritton Fraudulently Obtained Loans Secured by Bearden's Property, 
52.The Warranty Deed with ils ini| lopn n l.iri.Mlinii was IYM oidnl In1 l tiidmi 
several months later. (/J. at 137; 143.) Grittoii still worked for Wardley when he 
recorded .; nu did not tell Bearden he had recorded the Warranty 
Deed. (Id 
53 Bearden's agreement with Gritton did not call for title to transfoi until aflni 
Gritton had fully paid for the Property. (Id. at 27-28.) 
f
 , uritton borrowed the sum of $32,020 from. 
Rocky Mountain Financial, Li_.v_, u^ ie Proper 
if \*i 44, 146-4" x-
--*.. . . . . , . w<v v initon borrowed an additional $17,000 from 
xvockyMountain, agum HMHJ mr Hupr-iiy ;i,\ i, Pihi'nj! (Ti I ,„ IX, L! , (I, ji I IS ) 
56. When Gritton tailed to make payments on the loans, ROCK Mountain 
commenced foreclosure proceedings (R. 707 at 143-44, 146-47 ' ' ~ 
oreclosur. ) Ii Hx.20; 
R 707 al 79-81, 89-90, 146.) • • 
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Bearden Discovers Gritton's Fraud, 
58. Gritton was staying at the Property within a short time after the July 11, 
1997 meeting. (Id. at 31.) He made the first monthly payments in October, as required 
by the REPC. (Id. at 32.) The next four payments (November, Decemiber, January 1998 
and February 1998) were made after Bearden called and reminded Gritton. (Id. at 32.) 
59. In May 1998, Gritton brought a check from his church and paid for March, 
April and May, 1998. (Id. at 33.) 
60. In all, Gritton only paid Bearden $3,200, and he has not made any 
payments since May of 1998. (Id. at 32-33.) 
61. When Gritton stopped making payments, Bearden tried to call him several 
times at Wardley's offices in June, July and August, 1998. (Id. at 33.) Bearden was told 
Gritton was not in. (Id. at 34.) She was not told that Gritton was no longer affiliated with 
Wardley. (W.at34.) 
62. At no time during the course of the transaction was Bearden ever notified 
by Gritton, Wardley or any of Wardley's representatives that Gritton was no longer 
authorized to act as a Wardley agent. (Id. at 34, 39.) 
63. Bearden's telephone number appears on the documents Gritton submitted 
to Wardley. (Tr. Ex. 10; R. 707 at 124.) 
64. At no time during the course of the transaction - including the time at 
which Gritton was notified by Wardley that the REPC had expired for lack of earnest 
money - did anyone from Wardley other than Gritton contact Bearden to investigate the 
status of the transaction between Gritton and Bearden. (R. 707 at 34, 39.) 
1A1A1A 1 ?fi 
65. Bearden finally contacted an attorney to look m n vrilini' i opn>i i ( ml 
papers she had signed and getting Gritton to make the promised payments. (R. 707 
ai ilu1 ink1 HI ilit1 hoperty had been transferred to Gritton (R , 707 
at 35) and that large liens had been placed n^niisf 
66. In order to avoid foreclosure, Bearden was required to take out two loans. 
(Iii .nil lM -1) / i I liese loans were used to pay off the loans Gritton had taken out using the 
property us eolhfVLil Hv Ins' l.un w i>, "ii1 d • .mumn "I 1AI11 "10 " i 1 \ ," I i I lie 
second loan was in the amount of $9,621.15. (Tr. Ex. 22.) 
6 7. A day or so before the sale, Bearden was able to pay Gritton's loans off and 
save • ) 
~w. w-^on moved out on Novem K UIL: unit i 
to do so by the lower court. (R. 210; R. 70 at 150.) 
Benefit to Wardlev 
69, Although Wardley received no comn • 
transaction (R. 707 at 129), Gritton repeatedly demanded ihai i^ch a commission be puAJ 
ivy H'Midm, ami B/jitlni (iilnidctl lo do so had Gritton ever paid the agreed upon 
purchase price of the home. (M. at 30.) 
I. »UUDL 
In denying Wardley's Motion for Summary Jiuh:r 
*
n
 ;ne reasoning set forth in the Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's 
Judgment ( Memory . ..
 :>position'n filed by Beau:. 
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Central both to Bearden's argument and, therefore, the trial court's ruling, was the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. J CM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1983). Because Phillips is no longer good law, the lower court's denial of Wardley's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
In Phillips, the court found that Utah's statutory system pertaining to real estate 
brokers and salespersons contained "numerous implications of an employer-employee 
relationship." 666 P.2d at 881. As noted by Bearden, the Phillips decision determined 
that "based on Utah's statutory scheme governing the profession, [the real estate] Agent 
was an 'employee' of Broker. Thus, Broker was responsible for the tortious actions of 
Agent which were done within the course and scope of employment."2 (R. 270.) 
However, the statutory scheme relied upon by the court in Phillips was amended 
shortly after that decision was announced to specifically allow for an independent 
contractor relationship The references to "employment" and "employed" in Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-8, upon which the Phillips court relied were eliminated. See L. 1985, 
ch. 162 § 2. 
Prior to 1985, and at the time of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Phillips, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3 defined a "real estate salesman" as "any person employed or 
engaged by or on behalf of a licensed real estate broker." Phillips, 666 P.2d at 881 
2
 As further noted by Bearden, "[i]n reaching its decision, the Court did not rely on 
the subagency theory. Instead, it concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to 
find that Agent had acted within the scope of his employment. Thus, the question of 
subagency was moot." (Memorandum in Opposition, R. 270-71.) Bearden's argument 
that Gritton was a subagent of Wardley is addressed below. 
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(emphasis UJJL\; 1 he definition of "real estate sales agen ' *v ^ 
z\i... : « J ^ ^ *. .inii- .rc2(*~- "any person employed or engaged as an independent 
i • sed principal real estate broker." (Emphasis 
added,; The Ltan Legislature cleaHv expanded the s< .»iv \ t llif slaMlm s» I iiiu 
governing real estate brokers and agents to allow for independent contractor relationships 
a 
The trial court should not morels h;i\ r assunu'd lli.il < »i illon w .i"« .111 'employee'" of 
Wardley. Rather, it should have made a legal and factual determination a> * 
cHil'i'lt iyei • employee relationship existed, "Whether an employer-employee relationship 
exists . . . is determine : w . , . , ,^nt to control the 
employee." Glover ex rcl. Dy^un v. Boy Scout* oj Am ' * * * - MS^ 11 'hh IUUii I 
(sustaining summary judgment finding the Boy Scouts of America and Great Salt Lake 
< ' MINI il, I I'.MJ 1 i
 (i'i"ii|! in n - Hi 11 nil a scoutmaster's activities and, therefore, .* ild mn \ 
vicariously liable for the scoutmaster's negligence w hit li, nipm il l dr1, ' 1 I1 Based on 
MU>VCI\ if Wardley did not have the "right to control"4 Gritton, he was not W >-.• ' 
"- addition, the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10, no longer precludes 
a icai estate salesman from accepting commissions "from, any person, except his 
emplo\er, who must be a licensed real estate broker." It now provides that no valuable 
consideration can be accepted "from any person except the principal broker with whom,. 
he is affiliated and licensed." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10 (2000), 
4 
\\ lutlni in u/<n'<7. 1 vjpijme ;- ourt i.^ s 
identified several "main facts \\ hich an helpful in determining 
whether an employer had the right to control an alleged employee, 
[Citation omitted.] These factors include (i) whatever covenants 
or agreements exist concerning the right of direction and control 
over the employee; (ii) the right to hire and fire <iii^  the -xthocl 
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employee and Wardley "could not be found vicariously liable for his tortious conduct." 
Id. at 1385. See also Thompson v. Jess 1999 UT 22, f 13, 979 P.2d 322 (employer of 
independent contractor not liable for harm caused by contractor or his servants where 
employer does not control means of accomplishing work). 
Thus, the trial court erred in not analyzing or even addressing whether the 
relationship between Wardley and Gritton was employer-employee, or whether Wardley 
exercised a sufficient degree of control over Gritton as an independent contractor so as to 
hold Wardley responsible for Gritton's conduct. For these reasons, the denial of 
summary judgment should be reversed. 
II. WARDLEY CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
GRITTON'S FRAUD. 
Bearden sought and the jury found Wardley was vicariously liable for Gritton's 
fraud based on three theories: 1) respondeat superior, 2) apparent authority; and 
3) subagency. Whether viewed from the vantage of Wardley's principal-agent 
(employer-employee) relationship with Gritton, or its principal-agent relationship with 
Bearden - with Gritton acting as its subagent - reasonable minds could not disagree with 
of payment (i.e., wages versus payment for a completed job or 
project); and (iv) the furnishing of equipment. 
923 P.2d at 1385-86 (citing Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1996)). 
Considerable testimony was presented which established that Gritton was an 
independent contractor: there was a written agreement to that effect (Tr. Ex. 3 at f 1); 
Gritton had no mandatory hours (R. 707 at 155); no obligation to attend meetings (id. 
at 155-56); Wardley did not control how he did his job - finding buyers and sellers or 
marketed properties (id.)\ Wardley did not withhold taxes for Gritton (id. at 157); did not 
pay for Gritton's license fees or costs of marketing. (Id.) 
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the conclusion that Gritton's actions wen y . . ' . - . : h>* 
scope of his subagency. 
A. Respondeat Man rmr - Scope of Employment 
If Gritton is viewed u^  Wardley's err:1!- •. \ • ": .t jt 
supeuoi, Wardley may he subje*. 1 to liahii.v. tor Gnitoti's tortious acts done within the 
employment * * I tab Supreme Court has adopted a 
• pari analysis to addi e ^ • .* ..inn the scope of 
-r~-V nu-nt. /?/•;•,< • v/// LuAx County, 7/1 P.2d 1053 fUta' 
First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind the 
employee is employed to perform 
Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the h u s 
of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of* <*»•• 
employment.... 
imra, me employee's tuiiuuci must oe motivated, at least in 
part, by the purpose of sprviiw ih^ >M^po.v^r\: —tcrc^ 
• * (- . • L naiions omitted). Wardley only needs to show Bearden 
cannot nv Molerway 1 -~ht Lines, !<h Q ? " P 7 e " 
4 (Utah Ct. App. iJ94; f An emplovee who • i n i« cc iactors is 
outside the scope of empl* >> mem and the employer cannot be held liable under the 
'. >r . ; , L : , tnv"*- v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1040 (Utah 1991)). 
The undisputed facts established at the time of the denial of (lie SUIIIIIIJI \ 
j - 4 xi- -aJ tne e\ ;dence presented at the trial in this case, show that Bearden 
failed to satisfy huh *fn «'".i ,M "i,., i / M^J,-, , meiu |"",'" |lien the employee's activity 
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is so clearly within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot 
differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." Christensen v. Swenson, 874 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 
1991), and Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057). The lower court should have granted Wardley's 
motion for summary judgment and motion for directed verdict. This Court should 
overturn the jury's verdict. 
1. Gritton's Conduct Was Not of the General Kind He Was 
Employed to Perform, 
In denying Wardley's motion for summary judgment, the trial court effectively 
expanded the scope of the second Birkner factor5 to swallow the first Birkner factor. Just 
because the wrongful act was performed within the physical and spatial boundaries of 
employment, or in connection with the legitimate activities of an employee, does not 
result in liability, if that conduct was not within the general kind the employee is 
employed to perform. 
In an effort to satisfy the first prong of Birkner, Bearden argued that, as a real 
estate agent, the services Gritton provided on behalf of Wardley include helping 
individuals buy or sell real property and, therefore, Gritton's effort to buy real property 
on his own behalf did not remove him from his role as Wardley's agent. This approach 
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
5
 The second Birkner factor requires a finding that "the employee's conduct must 
occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the 
employment." 771 P.2d at 1056-57. This factor was conceded by Wardley in the court 
below and in this court. 
11 
In Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995), the court held that Mr. 
Righter's employer was not vicariously liable for Righter's alienation of the affections of 
another employee whom Righter supervised. In that case, Righter's job included 
supervising and managing employees - specifically, "hiring, evaluating, promoting, and 
firing employees." 891 P.2d at 1389. Righter was the immediate supervisor of Jackson, 
the woman who was the object of his affections and he had authority "to promote, 
evaluate, train, and give raises to Mrs. Jackson." Id. at 1391. 
The evidence in Righter was that Righter's affections had been shown by 
promoting Jackson, authorizing her to record unworked overtime hours as an unofficial 
raise, and giving her substantial bonuses. Id. at 1392. In addition, the tortious conduct 
took place "during a formal employee evaluation in [Righter's] office. Id. at 1391. 
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that Righter's alleged acts were part of "of the general 
kind [he was] employed to perform," the court focused on the specific wrongful acts 
which allegedly caused plaintiff's harm: 
Mr. Righter was not authorized to use his supervisory position to 
engage in a romantic relationship with his subordinates. His 
romantic advances were not a part of his duties but amounted to 
an abandonment of the supervisory and managerial 
responsibilities he was hired to perform. 
247434_2 33 
Id. at 1391. Thus, the fact that Righter "used his company duties as a springboard for 
pursuing his relationship with Mrs. Jackson," id. at 1391, did not result in vicarious 
liability for his employer.6 
The same focus on the specific conduct which caused the harm at issue was 
evident in J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). In J.H. by D.H., 
the court held that a police officer's sexual molestations of a youth under his supervision 
was clearly outside the scope of employment because the officer's acts were not of the 
kind and nature he was employed to perform. Id. at 123. The second prong of the 
Birkner test was satisfied - the molestations occurred while the police officer was on 
duty, performing his assigned duties supervising the Law Enforcement Explorer Scout 
program organized by the City and in a City-owned patrol car knowingly used to 
transport participants the explorer program activities. Id. at 123. However, the first 
prong was not. 
As in Righter, the plaintiff asserted that because the officer was employed to 
instruct and supervise youth and his wrongful actions were carried out pursuant to this 
type of instruction and supervision, the City should be liable. The court again rejected 
this approach "because it is not the instruction and supervision by [the officer] of which 
[plaintiff] now complains." Id. The court noted: 
6
 Because Righter affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
employer, the court viewed the facts and the inferences therefrom, in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. 891 P.2d at 1391. In addition, since the scope of employment 
analysis is ordinarily a question of fact, the court had to determine that the employee's 
conduct was "so clearly outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot 
differ." Id. (citations omitted). 
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[The officer] was not hired or authorized to instruct the explorers 
in sexual matters, nor was he authorized to touch the explorers in 
any manner. His acts of molestation were not in any way part of 
the instruction and supervision of the explorers but were in fact a 
complete abandonment of that instruction and of his employment. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 2001 UT 
App 48,19, fn. 5 (although the real estate agent "may have had authority to enter into the 
listing agreements with the [Seller]; however, he did not, under any agency theory, have 
authority to fraudulently change the dates on those agreements."). 
Here, Gritton was not hired or authorized to purchase property for his own use and 
benefit; prepare and record warranty deeds (a function handled by title companies); take 
out loans secured by real property; or fail to repay loans. Real estate agents in general are 
not hired to do such things. Gritton's conduct in this case amounted to a complete 
abandonment of the responsibilities he was contracted to perform. The fact that he used 
his position with Wardley "as a springboard," is no reason to hold Wardley liable. On 
these issues, reasonable minds cannot differ. 
2. Gritton's Fraudulent Conduct Was Not Motivated Even in Part 
by the Purpose of Serving Wardley's Interest, 
Although Wardley does not need to defeat another of the three Birkner factors, 
D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d at 4, Bearden has also failed to 
establish that Gritton was acting, even in part, for Wardley's benefit. The court in 
Birkner explained what was needed to satisfy this requirement: 
If the employee acts "from purely personal motives . . . in no way 
connected with the employer's interests" or if the conduct is 
"unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous," then the 
master is not liable. 
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771 P.2d at 1057 (quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70, 
at 506 (5th ed. 1984)). In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
An employee's conduct is usually not in the scope of employment 
where the employee's motivation for the activity is personal, even 
though some transaction of business or performance of duty may 
also occur. 
891 P.2d at 1391 (citations omitted). 
Significantly, like the tortfeasor in Jackson, Gritton admitted that he acted solely 
and exclusively for his own benefit. While this fact was disputed in consideration of 
Wardley's summary judgment motion (R. 235, 264), it was established at trial by 
testimony from Gritton: 
Q Did you have any intent to benefit Wardley in taking 
out those loans? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any intent to benefit Wardley when you 
had the warranty deed prepared? 
A No. 
Q What about when the warranty deed was recorded? 
A No. 
(R. 707 at 164.) 
No evidence was presented that Gritton was motivated in any way whatsoever to 
benefit Wardley with any of these acts. The only evidence Bearden introduced was that: 
• Gritton mentioned that both he and Wardley were to receive a commission as a 
result of the Bearden transaction. (R. 707 at 30.) 
• Bearden understood that the commissions were to be paid out of the purchase 
price. (Id.) 
1A1AT\A ? 
^fi 
• Gritton repeatedly demanded that a commission be paid to Wardley by 
Bearden, and that Bearden intended to do so had Gritton ever paid the agreed 
upon purchase price of the home. (Id.) 
While it presented no testimony at trial, in connection with Wardley's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Bearden took the position that: 
• Wardley received the benefit of having an agent who appeared to be effectively 
selling property for its clients. (R. 282.) 
• Bearden recommended and expressed her general satisfaction with both 
Wardley and Gritton to her friends, associates, and family following the 
supposed sale on July 11, 1999. (R. 282, 285-86.) 
All of these facts, however, go to the underlying real estate transaction, not the fraud for 
which Bearden wants to hold Wardley responsible. 
Although Gritton's misconduct took place in connection with his legitimate 
activities as a real estate agent for Wardley, his fraudulent actions were not the general 
kind of activities a real estate agent performs. In addition, they were not intended to 
further Wardley's interest but, rather, as Gritton testified, to serve solely the private and 
personal interests of Gritton. 
B. Wardley Never Clothed Gritton With Apparent Authority, 
The main fallacy of Bearden's apparent authority argument is that "'[a]n agent's 
apparent... authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the principal.'" Bodell 
Construction Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988)) 
(emphasis added). The Bodell court continued to quote from Zions: 
"The authority of the agent [is not] 'apparent' merely because it 
looks so to the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who 
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must cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with 
apparent authority It follows that one who deals exclusively 
with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that agent's 
authority despite the agent's representations/' 
Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124, (quoting Zions (quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-
Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90) (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added). As the court in Zions noted, 
"liability is premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the 
conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions." 762 
P.2d at 1095 (emphasis added). 
Here, Wardley only authorized Gritton to act as its Agent in a limited capacity. 
(Tr. Ex. 3 and Ex. 4.) See Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124 (noting that First Title was Stewart 
Title's agent for a "limited purpose.") Bearden relied on Gritton's statements about the 
scope of Wardley's involvement, not Wardley's. No one from Wardley told her that its 
attorney's would review all of the papers Gritton asked her to sign; Gritton did. (R. 707 
at 28; 65-66.) No one from Wardley told her that its notary would certify her signature 
on any of the papers Gritton asked her to sign; Gritton did. (Id. at 30.) Bearden did not 
ask Wardley to ensure that Gritton would pay his debt to her - she trusted Gritton. (Id. 
at 66.) She did not ask Wardley to confirm the financial information Gritton had given 
her. (Id. at 67.) Rather, she "trusted him;" "accepted his word." (Id. (emphasis added).) 
Furthermore, Wardley was unaware of several crucial facts. Although Wardley 
knew Gritton was acting as a purchaser of a property he listed, in violation of company 
policy, it knew that no earnest money had been paid and, when Wardley inquired about 
this problem, it was told that the deal had failed. (R. 226.) In this context, there would 
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have been no reason for Wardley to take the actions Bearden identifies in an effort to 
make it appear like Wardley - as opposed to Gritton - did something or failed to do 
something of consequence. 
Wardley providing Gritton an office, and business cards and forms with Wardley's 
logo, are not enough to "cloak" Gritton with apparent authority. Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124. 
In Bodell, a title insurance company, First Title of Utah, Inc. ("First Title"), handled a 
closing, issuing a title insurance policy underwritten by Stewart Title Guaranty Company. 
First Title's agreement with Stewart Title expressly stated that while First Title could 
handle closing escrows, it could not "represent to the public that it is an agent of [Stewart 
Title] in the conduct of the escrow business." 945 P.2d at 122. First Title handled a 
transaction which involved, among other things, a "double" escrow allowing the sale 
price to be inflated, concealing a commission to a related party. Id. Although Stewart 
Title allowed First Title to use Stewart Title's name on First Title's letterhead, title 
policies, and settlement statements, the court determined that "[a]ny appearance of 
authority to act as Stewart Title's agent in escrow, closing, or settlement transactions 
came from First Title, not Stewart Title." Id. at 124. The court went on to note that "if 
plaintiffs really believed that First Title was acting as Stewart Title's agent for settlement, 
escrow, or closing transactions, then they were under an obligation to ascertain the scope 
of that agency." Id. Like Wardley in this case, Stewart Title never had any contact with 
the plaintiffs. Id. at 122. 
In addition, there is no evidence that Wardley had "knowledge of and 
acquiescence in" Gritton's actions. Wardley was unaware of Gritton's prior relationship 
247434_2 O Q 
with Bearden. Wardley cannot be held responsible for knowing or understanding that 
Bearden would place so much trust in Gritton that she would not read documents7 - in 
essence throwing caution to the wind. 
When an agent is authorized to act as an agent for limited purposes, the agent's 
actions which go well beyond those actions cannot bind the authorizing entity, absent 
some action on its part. The focus of the inquiry is on what Wardley did; not what 
Gritton did; on what Wardley knew; not what Gritton knew. 
The only things Wardley did here (based on the marshaled facts) was: 
• be recognized as a reputable real estate broker; 
• hire Gritton; 
• provide him with forms for listing properties (but not for transferring title); 
• maintain a transaction file on the REPC between Gritton and Bearden, making 
Wardley aware that Gritton was acting as both Wardley's real estate agent 
representing the seller and as buyer; 
• never calling Gritton about his violating its policy against buying properties he 
was listing; 
• never contacting Bearden and offering to provide Bearden with an alternate 
agent or asking another agent to step in and represent Bearden; 
• maintain a trust account for this transaction 
The Listing Agreement (Tr. Ex. 4) states in bold at the top: 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT - READ 
CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. 
In addition, Bearden was no novice at real estate transactions and well knew the 
significance of a document needing a notarized signature. (R. 707 at 64.) When she 
noticed that something needed to be notarized (R. 707 at 28-29), she testified that she 
trusted Gritton (R. 707 at 64); trusted him because she knew him and his family. (Id.) 
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• be aware that Gritton failed to make the earnest money payment to Bearden, as 
required by the REPC; and 
• never calling Bearden about this problem. 
Wardley was unaware of the fraud and, because Gritton was misrepresenting the 
transaction to Wardley. (See e.g. R. 708 at 226 (Wardley was advised that the transaction 
with Bearden had failed).) There is no basis to impute Gritton's knowledge to Wardley. 
Because the REPC in Wardley's file indicated that Gritton was paying the full asking 
price, "[t]here were no terms in there that would cause alarm." (R. 708 at 195.) 
(Wardley was unaware that the price had been reduced by 6% so Bearden could avoid 
paying a commission. (Tr. Ex. 8; R. 707 at 60-61,136.)) 
C. Problem With "Agent" Jury Instructions, 
The difficulty here is that the lower court's instructions to the jury were 
unnecessarily confusing with respect to the issue of Gritton's actions and statements 
being equated with the actions and statements of Wardley - in a way that was prejudicial 
to Wardley. The court correctly instructed the jury that Wardley's liability for Gritton's 
actions as its "agent" was limited: 
A principal is liable to others for the acts or omissions of the 
agent, if the agent was acting within the scope of the agent's 
employment or in the course of carrying out the agent's express 
duties at the time the claim arose. 
Instruction No. 36, Liability of Principal for Acts of Agents (R. 460) (emphasis added). 
(For the same reasons articulated above, Wardley cannot be held liable for Gritton's 
actions as they were outside of the scope of his agency.) 
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In an earlier instruction, however, the trial court had told the jury that Gritton's 
acts could bind Wardley because "Wardley Corporation is a corporation and, as such, can 
act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents." 
Instruction No. 23, Corporation Acts Through Its Agents (R. 446) (emphasis added). 
The use of the word "agents" in the factual context of this case - dealing with 
independent contractor real estate agents - was prejudicial. Clearly, Gritton is not the 
type of corporate agent who can bind Wardley in the general context of Instruction 
No. 23. However, no one told the jury that "agent" meant something different in the 
context of this instruction. 
Thus, all of the instructions which focus on Wardley's actions or knowledge are 
tainted by the jury's having been instructed that Wardley, as a corporation, "can act only 
through its . . . agents," of whom Gritton was one. See Instruction No. 26(A), Fraudulent 
Omission - Confidential or Fiduciary Relationship (R. 450); Instruction No. 28, 
Intentional or Reckless Misrepresentation (R. 452 ("whether Guy Gritton made a 
deliberate misrepresentation") (emphasis added)); Instruction No. 29, Statement of 
Opinion of Belief (R. 453 ("whether the defendants' statement was a representation of 
fact") (emphasis added)); Instruction No. 32, Material Fact (R. 456 ("whether Guy 
Gritton's statement related to a material fact") (emphasis added)); and Instruction 
Instruction No. 23 is identical to and obviously was taken from the Model Utah 
Jury Instructions ("MUJI") No. 25.1. The model instruction cites only Radio Corp. of 
Am. v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1970). That case involved a 
defense of want of authority based on a corporation's assertion that its president lacked 
authority to enter into the contract at issue. 
AO 
No. 33, Intent to Induce Reliance (R. 457 ("whether Guy Gritton intended to 
induce . . . . " "whether Guy Gritton made the representation " "It is sufficient if the 
defendant made a misrepresentation . . . . " ) (emphasis added).) 
The instructions so inexorably bound Wardley to Gritton and used "Gritton" and 
"defendant" so interchangeably that the jury was confused. So confused that they sought 
clarification on this point - resulting in another procedural misstep by the trial court. 
D. Gritton's Conduct Was Outside The Scope of His Subagency. 
For the same reasons articulated in connection with Wardley's scope of 
employment argument, above, Gritton's conduct was not within the scope of his 
subagency relationship with Wardley. Wardley is not liable for every conceivable act its 
subagent might commit. Rather, as the rule of law states, Wardley can only be found 
liable "if the agent was acting within the scope of the agent's employment or in the 
course of carrying out the agent's express duties." Instruction No. 36, Liability of 
Principal for Acts of Agents (R. 460). See also Phillips, 666 P.2d at 882 (the action 
complained must be in "reference to the principal's affairs entrusted to the subagent"). 
As noted above, an agent's function - and therefore the scope of his authority and the 
limit of his principal's liability - can be limited. Bodell Construction Co. v. Stewart Title 
Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("First Title is Stewart Title's agent for the 
limited purpose of issuing title insurance policies and commitments." (Emphasis 
added)); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). 
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III. WARDLEY CANNOT BE HELD DIRECTLY LIABLE FOR THE 
RESULTS OF GRITTON'S FRAUD. 
Bearden sought and the jury found Wardley was directly liable for Gritton's fraud 
based on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. In addition, the jury held Wardley directly 
liable for punitive damages. 
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
Because of the confusion created by the jury instructions, it is not certain whether 
the jury decided this issue based on Gritton's actions or Wardley's. The only witness 
with a significant background in real estate matters, Jeff Sommers, testified that even 
with hindsight, Wardley could not have seen Gritton's fraudulent scheme coming. 
(R. 708 at 196.) No other witness testified as to the standard of care that governs real 
estate professionals or what Wardley should have done. The jury was left to fend for 
themselves, apparently grabbing onto Bearden's suggestions that she should have been 
called or another agent should have intervened when Wardley became aware Gritton was 
buying the property. (Id. at 224.) 
However, any concerns raised about Gritton buying a property he had listed were 
alleviated by the fact that it appeared from the information Wadley had that the full 
purchase price was being paid. {Id. at 194-96, 226.) In addition, Wardley did not react to 
this transaction because, a victim itself of Gritton's fraud, it had been told the deal had 
fallen through. (Id.) 
AA 
Without any evidence of duty, there can be no determination of a breach. Without 
a breach, the claims against Wardley must fail with regard to the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. 
B. There Was No Basis for the Jury's Award of Punitive Damages 
Against Wardley. 
There is no basis for the jury's award of punitive damages against Wardley. 
1. Because Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Recover On Any of Its 
Theories, Wardley Cannot Be Liable for Punitive Damages, 
As discussed in detail above, Wardley should have been granted summary 
judgment or a directed verdict on Bearden's claims against it. The evidence presented 
was not sufficient to hold Wardley liable for Gritton's fraud, and there is no evidence that 
anyone else at Wardley acted willfully or recklessly toward Bearden. Once Bearden's 
theories of liability are discounted, there is no basis for imposing punitive damages on 
Wardley. 
2. There Was No Basis for Finding Wardley Liable for Punitive 
Damages, 
Even if Wardley could be held vicariously liable for Gritton's conduct, punitive 
damages still should not have been awarded against Wardley, either on the basis of its 
own conduct, or based on Gritton's conduct. 
Questions 8 and 9 of the Special Verdict put the issue of punitive damages to the 
jury - Question 8 for Gritton; Question 9 for Wardley. (R. 473-74.) Accordingly, there 
is no doubt that Wardley was being held responsible for punitive damages based on its 
own conduct, not that of Gritton; and for conduct in addition to and separate from 
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Gritton's. Question 9 asks: "do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts 
or omissions of Wardley were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that 
manifested a knowing reckless indifference toward, and a disregard for, the rights of Mr. 
and Mrs. Bearden?" (R. 474.) 
Similarly, the Addendum to Special Verdict put the issue of the amount of 
punitive damages to the jury - Question 1 for Gritton; Question 2 for Wardley. 
(R. 475-76.) Question 2 of the Addendum to Special Verdict states: "If you answered 
Question 9 of the Special Verdict "Yes" you may award a sum which, in your judgement 
[sic], would be reasonable and proper punishment to Wardley for its treatment of Mr. and 
Mrs. Bearden, and as a wholesome warning to others not to offend in a like manner." 
(R. 475-76.) The jury answered Question 9 "yes", and awarded $15,000 in punitive 
damages against Wardley.9 This was error. 
As a corporation, Wardley can act only through its agents - its officers and other 
employees.10 Stratton v. West States Constr., 440 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1968). However, 
a corporation is not automatically liable for punitive damages simply because someone in 
the corporation committed a bad act, and acted willfully or recklessly in doing so. 
Rather, the person committing the act must have been sufficiently high-up in the 
corporation to justify holding the corporation responsible. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 
9
 The jury separately awarded $25,000 in punitive damages against Gritton. 
10
 Jury Instruction No. 23 prejudiced Wardley because Gritton was not an agent for 
this purpose. That is, it is highly likely that the jury was confused by the instruction that 
a corporation can act only through its agents when Gritton was always referred to as 
Wardley's agent. However, Gritton was not an agent for this purpose. 
**
AnAttA
 ^ Afx 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court adopted Section 909 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts for the test of whether punitive damages can properly be awarded 
against a master or other principal (i.e., a corporation) because of an act by an agent. Id. 
at 779. Under the Restatement such liability can be imposed only if: 
(a) the principal or managerial agents authorized the doing and 
the manner of the act, or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent 
was reckless in employing or retaining him, or 
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was 
acting in the scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or 
approved the act. 
Id. at 776-77; see also Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991). 
Satisfaction of one of these factors is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages 
against a corporation. Someone at a managerial level must have authorized the act, 
committed the act, ratified the act, or been reckless in employing the lower-level agent 
that in fact committed the act. Under Utah law, there is no other basis on which to 
impose punitive damages on a corporation. See also Flint Hills Rural Elec. Coop. v. 
Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co., 941 P.2d 374 (Kans. 1997) (characterizing Restatements 
Section 909 "complicity rule" as one of direct, not vicarious liability.) 
Applying the Utah Supreme Court's rule in Johnson to this case, there was no 
basis on which to impose punitive damages against Wardley. The only evidence 
regarding willful, malicious, or reckless conduct went to Gritton. There is no evidence 
that anyone associated with Wardley, other than Gritton, acted in a culpable manner. 
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(See R. 708 at 196 (even in retrospect, nothing would have alerted Wardley to a problem 
on this transaction).) Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that 
would tend to show Gritton was a managerial level agent of Wardley, or that someone at 
a managerial level in any way ratified what Gritton had done. Similarly, there is no claim 
made that Gritton's conduct was authorized by any of Wardley's managerial agents, that 
Gritton was unfit, or that any of Wardley's managerial agents were reckless in hiring or 
retaining Gritton.11 In fact, Gritton came to Wardley with an excellent reputation. 
(R. 708 at 183-84.) 
In sum, the evidence shows that Gritton was the only person who may have acted 
willfully, recklessly, or maliciously. His actions cannot be imputed to Wardley for the 
purposes of punitive damages. Therefore, the jury's award of punitive damages should 
be set aside. 
IV. OTHER PROBLEMS 
A. Problems with the Special Verdict Form 
The Special Verdict was prejudicial to Wardley for several reasons. Most notably, 
the Special Verdict instructs the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard for 
determining fraud. In addition, it compounds the confusion created by the Jury 
Instructions as to the roles of Gritton and Wardley. 
11
 Interestingly, although Bearden alleged that Wardley was liable for not adequately 
supervising Gritton (R. 80-101 at ff 93, 98 and 111), and submitted jury instructions on 
the issue of negligent supervision (R. 387-88), the requested instructions were not given 
to the jury by the trial court. (R. 423-70.) None of the instructions dealt with any claim 
of reckless hiring or retention of Gritton. (Id.) 
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1. The Special Verdict Form Asks the Jury to Apply an Incorrect 
Evidentiary Standard. 
The Special Verdict form used by the trial court was prejudicial to Wardley 
because it instructed the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard. Specifically, the 
introduction starts out by instructing the jury to answer the following questions "from a 
preponderance of the evidence." (R. 471.) In Question #1, the Special Verdict form then 
asks: 
Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find that Mr. 
Gritton defrauded Mrs. Bearden and/or breached a fiduciary duty 
toward her in the transaction involving the home at 550 Adams 
Street? 
(Id.) 
In addition to confusing the issues of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, this 
compound question is significantly wrong because it instructs the jury to determine fraud 
by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Utah law is very clear that fraud must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, f 33, 21 P.3d 198; Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., Utah, 607 P.2d 293, 294-95 (1980) The Special Verdict 
form proposed by Wardley made this distinction clear. (R. 413.) 
2. The Court Erred When It Did Not Notify or Call the Attorneys 
Into Court to Consider Questions From the Jury. 
As noted above, Question #1 asks whether "Gritton" defrauded Bearden. This 
confuses Gritton's acts with those of Wardley. This problem with the Special Verdict 
form was apparent in a question regarding Special Verdict Question #2 which the jury 
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had. (R. 421.) This problem was accentuated by the trial court's failure to notify counsel 
of the fact that a request for additional instruction had come in during jury deliberations. 
The determination of the propriety of a trial court's communication with a jury 
during deliberations is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and the trial court 
will be reversed only if the error is "substantial or prejudicial... such that the result 
would have been different had it not taken place." Board of Commissioners of the State 
Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Utah 1997)(quoting Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 
441 (Utah 1979)). 
During its deliberations, the jury raised a question regarding Special Verdict 
Question #2. The jury asked the following two questions: 
(1) Does "acts" means all or any one of the offending actions of 
Mr. Gritton; 
(2) Does "acts" refer only to the "defrauding and/or fiduciary 
duties of Mr. Gritton." 
(R. 421.) In response, the trial court wrote back: 
The term "acts" is intended to refer to the alleged offending 
conduct described in Ques. #1 only. 
(R. 422.) 
Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for 
deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part 
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of 
law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct 
them into court. Upon their being brought into court the 
information required must be given in the presence of, or after 
notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given 
in writing or stated on the record. 
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This rule was at issue in Board of Commissioners of the State Bar v. Peterson, 937 
P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997). There, the jury submitted a written question to the judge 
regarding jury instructions relating to the definition of "the practice of law" and "the 
unauthorized practice of law." Id. at 1271. The jury asked whether the definitions in the 
instructions were to be recognized as law or as the judge's opinion. Id. Without notice to 
either attorney, the judge responded to the jury in writing as follows: "The law as written 
in the instructions and as read to you by the court is binding upon you, the jury. A jury 
decides the facts and applies them to the law." Id. Before the jury returned with a 
verdict, the attorneys came back to the courtroom, and the judge read the jury's question 
to them as well as the judge's response. Neither attorney raised any objections. On 
appeal, Peterson claimed that the trial court erred in its response to the jury's inquiry 
during deliberations, arguing that under rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
court should have at least notified the attorneys before responding to the jury. Id. at 
1270. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court held in Peterson that the error was harmless, in 
this case, the court's sua sponte instruction was not. Here, the jury's question indicates 
that it was confused about the very jury instructions to which Wardley had attempted to 
object and now complains about. The trial court's failure to notify the parties of the 
jury's question was harmful because it failed to give the attorneys a chance to get at the 
source of the jury's confusion. The Special Verdict was unclear and confusing, as 
illustrated by the jury's question regarding its meaning. 
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B. Amount of Damages, 
1. The Jury's Damage Award is Not Supported By the Evidence. 
Even if this Court upholds the jury's determination that Wardley is vicariously 
liable for Gritton's conduct, the damages award should be set aside or remitted. 
Although juries are generally allowed wide discretion in their assessment of damages, 
those damages must still be supported by competent evidence. See Cornia v, Wilcox, 
898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995) (on appeal, the court "view[s] the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury's findings and will uphold the jury's calculation of damages, 
so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it.") (additional citations omitted). In 
this case, the damages award is not so supported. Rather, the basis of the damages award 
is a mystery, with the final figure appearing to have been pulled out of thin air. 
The Special Verdict asked the jury to "state the amount of damages, if any, 
suffered by the Bearden as a proximate result of the Defendants' conduct." (R. 473.) 
The jury hand wrote in an amount of $75,000. (Id.) However, the evidence in the record 
supports an award of only $59,621.15, the amount of money Harold Bearden borrowed to 
pay off the loans Gritton took out using the property as collateral. This is shown when 
the evidence supporting the award of damages is marshaled. The following facts could 
conceivably support the award of damages: 
1. In order to avoid foreclosure, Bearden's husband, Harold Bearden, was 
required to take out two loans. (R. 707 at 94-97.) These loans were used to 
pay off the loans Gritton had taken out using the property as collateral. The 
first loan was in the amount of $50,000. (R. 420, Tr. Ex. 21.) The second 
loan was in the amount of $9,621.15. (Id., Tr. Ex. 22.) 
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2. Harold Bearden's loans were variable interest rate loans charging rates of 
8% to 10^2% (R. 707 at 98.) 
riarold Bearden testified that each time he got a notice from the bank, the 
interest rate would be higher, but did not produce the statements from the 
bank. (Id. at 98,100.) 
A Harold Bearden testified that he had paid $8,000 to $10,000 interest on the 
loans. (Id. at 98-99.) 
5. The loans were paid off within 18 months when Harold Bearden sold other 
property to pay them off. (Id.) 
uucille Bearden testified that at the time she and Gritton were conducting 
their initial negotiations regarding the purchase of the house by Gritton, she 
was renting it for $600 to $625 per month. (Id. at 10-11.) 
7 Gritton lived in the house for approximately 13 months, moving out on 
November 3, 1998 (Id. at 38.) 
8. The purchase contract with Gritton set rent in the amount of $400 per 
month for five years. (R. 420, Tr. Ex. 8.) 
uucille Bearden testified that after Gritton moved out and the Beardens 
fixed up the house it rented for $850 to $900 per month. (R. 707 at 38-39.) 
2 Bearden's Own Motion Could Not Discern the Basis for the 
Jury's Damage Award. 
The fact tl iat the $75,000 damages award agaii ist ft a i dk > and Gi itton is not based 
on the evidence in the record was acknowledged in Bearden's own Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Prejudgment Interest 
("Motion for Attc >i ney's Fees"), filed aftei tl u i verdict was reti n i led (R 482-85.) There, 
Bearden divined that the jury made the following calculation when it wrote $75,000 on 
the Special Verdict form, stating: 
• "Plaintiffs estimate that $59,719.00 of the damages were awarded as 
compensation for money borrowed by the plaintiffs' to pay off two 
loans taken by Gritton." (R. 484 (emphasis added).) 
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Wardley does not contest that the evidence generally supports this figure. 
Bearden's Motion for Attorney's Fees then stated: 
• "Plaintiffs further estimate that $7,600.00 of the damages were 
awarded as compensation for rental income lost as a result of Gritton 
and Wardley's actions." (R. 484 (emphasis added).) 
This estimate is problematic because nowhere in the jury's verdict does there appear a 
basis for holding Wardley vicariously liable for rent Gritton did not pay during the 
approximately 13 months he lived in the house. Furthermore, even if there was such a 
basis, the $7,600 figure does not take into account the fact that Gritton paid the Beardens 
$3,200 in rent under the purchase contract. Specifically, Lucille Bearden testified that 
Gritton paid rent from October of '97 through May of '98. (R. 707 at 33.) Since he 
moved out in November of '98, (Id. at 38), this resulted in six months of unpaid rent at 
$400 per month for a total of $2400. This figure bears no reasonable relationship to the 
$7,600 figure. 
Bearden's Motion for Attorney's Fees added lost rent to the amount of the loans to 
reach the total of $67,319.00 in damages. They then add: 
• "Prejudgment interest of 10% on that amount from May 21, 1998, (the 
date on which Gritton took out the second of his two loans) through 
September 6, 2001, (the date on which the jury's verdict was reached) 
totals $14,883.00." (R. 484.) 
• Since this amount totals in excess of what the jury actually awarded 
($67,319.00 + $14,883.00 = $82,202.00), Bearden asked that the 
difference between the $14,883.00 calculated as the amount of interest 
12
 The evidence was that there were two loans in the amount of $50,000 (R. 420, Tr. 
Ex. 21) and $9,621.15 (Id., Tr. Ex. 22). These two loans therefore only total $59,621.15. 
The difference of $97.85 is only significant in terms of the confusion it reflects in the 
record relating to the amount of damages awarded by the jury. 
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the jury should have awarded and the $7,680.00 Bearden assumed the 
jury had already awarded as interest ($75,000 - $67,319.00) - or 
$7,203.0014-be added to the jury award. The trial court's final 
judgment reflects this calculation. (R. 643-44.) 
Again, this calculation is problematic. According to the plaintiffs, there were 
damages in the amount of $67,319.00 for money borrowed to pay off the loans, and lost 
rental income. To this, plaintiffs add prejudgment interest It is impossible to determine, 
hn\yr\n nli\ ifu1 inii'ii»M is drln mined fiom the date Gritton took out the second of his 
two loans. In fact, Bearden's damage would only have occurred from the date Harold 
Bearden took out the loans to pay off the loans initially taken out by Gritton. And, as 
Harold Bearden testif ied he pi obabl) paid only $8,000 to $10,000 in interest at a rate tl lat 
there is no evidence of. (No bank statements or other corroborating evidence was 
introduced to substantiate these figures.) Thus, the $14,883.00 figure is in reality, not 
tied to any evidence in the record. 
Ilie filial problem with the jury's damages award is that the was no way for the 
jury to account for damages caused by the settling defendants, Backman Stuart Title 
Company, Charlene Burns-Nielson, and the Old Republic Surety Group. Whereas 
Wardley's proposed Special Verdict for iii cleai !;> asked tl: ic ji it ;; to state what percentage 
of the negligence was attributable to each party (R. 419), there was no way for the jury to 
do so in the Special Verdict form used by the trial court (R. 471-76.) Failure to account 
Bearden's math was off $75,000 - $67,319.00 actually totals $7,681.00. 
The correct number should have been $7,202.00. See footnote 2, above. 
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for the damages caused by the settling parties may have led to a double recovery for 
Bearden. 
With all of the errors made in the instant case, the damages award in this case is 
similar to the one that was set aside as not supported by competent evidence in Cornia v. 
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). There, the plaintiffs brought an action for the loss of 
and damage to their cattle that grazed on defendant's property. Id. at 1381. The jury 
awarded damages for 90 cows at a rate of $715 each, which was the average market price 
for a pregnant mature cow. Id. at 1386. On appeal the defendant argued that the jury 
could not conclude that every missing cow should have been returned pregnant and that a 
fifty percent pregnancy rate was the only rate supported by the evidence. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court agreed, stating that even plaintiff's own expert conceded on cross-
examination that an unknown number of nonpregnant cows must be expected, resulting 
in a corresponding deduction in value per head. Id. In light of this, and because there 
was no other evidence supporting a 100% pregnancy rate, the court concluded that the 
jury's calculation of damages was not supported by competent evidence, and that the 
defendant was entitled to a remittitur. Id. The same conclusion should be reached here. 
The evidence in the record supports damages only in the amount of the loans taken out by 
Harold Bearden. In the event this Court upholds the jury's imposition of vicarious 
liability against Wardley, Wardley is at least entitled to have the damages award 
accurately reflect the damages sustained by the Beardens. Therefore, the damages award 
should be set aside, or at the very least remitted to the trial court for redetermination. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of summary judgment and motion for 
directed verdict shoi lid be re^  • ersed ai id tl le jiii > v ei diet ai id the judgment based thereon 
should be overturned. 
DATED this N \ day of August, 2002. 
Kevin N. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Wardley 
CERTIFICATE <ll SI KM( F 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of August, 2002,1 caused to be filed the 
original of the foregoing and seven copies with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk of the Court 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and to be served via hand-delivery, two true and correct copies of the foregoing, to: 
Thomas R. Barton, Esq. 
James W. McConkie, III, Esq. 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre 1, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
247434_2 S7 
